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MATERIALISM, SUBJECTIVITY AND THE 
OUTCOME OF FRENCH PHILOSOPHY
Interview with Adrian Johnston by Michael Burns & Brian Smith
University of  Dundee
Adrian Johnston is well known for his work at the intersection of Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
German idealism, contemporary French philosophy and most recently cognitive 
neuroscience. In the context of the current issue, Johnston represents the most complete 
development of a contemporary theory of Transcendental Materialism. In the following 
interview we explore both the implications of Johnston’s previous work, as well as the 
directions his most recent projects are taking. 
Michael Burns: At the ‘Real Objects or Material Subjects?’ conference you closed 
your paper with the line, ‘materialists and humanists, it’s time to unite: the day is ours’. 
I was wondering if you could flesh out what a ‘materialist humanism’ would look like in 
the contemporary philosophical climate?
Adrian Johnston: Since the conference at Dundee last year, I have had a chance to 
recast what I was getting at with reference specifically to Hegel. In particular to the 
section of the Phenomenology of Spirit entitled ‘Observing Reason’. One of the things I’m 
in the process of working out on the basis of these texts, such as the piece I presented 
in Dundee, is the notion that instead of us philosophically having to impose an exter-
nal check on the sciences, especially the natural sciences, in order to leave room for 
some of the things we might be interested in, and which we don’t feel can adequately 
be accounted for within the explanatory methodological frameworks of the sciences, 
we can, instead, taking a Hegelian dialectical phenomenological approach, argue that 
at this point one can step back and see the natural sciences themselves developing out 
of their own resources a sense of their limitations, vis a vis the things that, philosophi-
cally speaking, we are interested in. We can begin to account for how the sciences, on 
their own terms, are necessarily incomplete and that they can actually pinpoint the 
ways in which they’re incomplete. Hegel already tries this, when talking about the 
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emergence of the life sciences out of 17th and 18th century science, going back to Bacon 
and Galileo, but of course culminating in Newtonian mechanical physics. Hegel points 
out how these disciplines nonetheless have to rely on formulating their own terms; they 
develop a distinction between the animate and the inanimate and a notion of life, but 
they produce a notion of life out of themselves that they thereafter can’t contain or can’t 
do justice to. And, of course, the section on ‘Observing Reason’ famously culminates in 
the absurd doctrines of physiognomy and phrenology as the example of the last attempt 
to rein in what these sciences have produced out of themselves back within their own 
confines. I think that there’s something very much along these lines that’s going on in 
an even more striking fashion with the science of the last few decades.
So, to go back to your question: In the final lines, or rather the last few paragraphs, 
of the piece I presented in Dundee, the idea is that we don’t need to feel at this point 
threatened by the sciences as our adversaries. The old phenomenological or Frankfurt 
School critical theory narrative about how these disciplines have imposed this reductive 
levelling down of rationality and that we have to fight this is still very much a part of 
today’s discourse on biopolitics etc. that, to me, is completely wrongheaded and in fact 
misidentifies what the problems are and fails to realize that even if the individual sci-
entists themselves might be committed to some reductive or eliminative ideology, some 
sort of crude scientism, that the sciences themselves, and certain scientists of varying 
degrees of consciousness, are aware that there is this weird kind of dialectical mutation 
that’s occurring in those disciplines that can be productively put to work. Continuing to 
misrecognize and neglect that internal self-critique perpetuates a false debate that goes 
back essentially to things like Husserl’s complaint about the sciences at the start of the 
20th century.
MB: You recently published a paper on the work of Quentin Meillassoux in The 
Speculative Turn, and in the paper you seem to take a critical stance towards the lack of 
engagement with any notion of social or political praxis in both the work of Meillassoux 
and others associated with the label ‘speculative realism.’ Is this a fair assessment? 
AJ: I don’t think that that’s a fatal flaw. I think certainly there can be movement in a 
socio-political direction. And, of course, the person who comes closest to doing so, I 
think, is Brassier.
MB: This leads in to a more general question. Do you have any further critical thoughts 
on the recent turn towards a ‘speculative realism’ in contemporary philosophy?
AJ: I just finished a piece which I had to write for the folks at SUNY Buffalo, at the 
Umbr(a) Journal, that involves engaging with John McDowell’s version of neo-Hege-
lianism, and the sort of naturalism he’s interested in developing, especially in the 
second half of his seminal work Mind and World. He’s an incredibly interesting figure, 
and I think that for people who have an investment in speculative realism, materialism, 
call it what you will, he’s someone well worth taking a look at. I think more engage-
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ment with analytic philosophy would be useful, since that tradition has been working 
on these sorts of problems for quite some time now, and a number of figures have come 
up with very sophisticated positions that I think need to be reckoned with, if one is 
going to talk about issues having to do with realism and materialism. The same is true 
for analytic philosophy of science. I certainly think that for speculative realism it is not 
as though its relative lack of engagement with politics or, more broadly speaking, socio-
cultural issues, is necessarily an inherent limitation; I also feel there’s a lot of implicit 
background heavy lifting that’s done by a number of things having to do with a larger 
socio-political Zeitgeist. I think you see this come out much more clearly in adjacent 
figures to the movement like Bill Connolly and Jane Bennett who are at the Political 
Science department at John Hopkins. It’s much more obvious that issues having to 
do with concerns about the environment, for instance, and that old narrative about 
human hubris and our excessive Cartesian desire for dominance being part of what’s 
gotten us into the pickle we’re in now. I think that a lot of the motifs and the juice, you 
might say, that’s fuelling this at a tacit level goes back to those sorts of social and politi-
cal issues, but it’s not very clearly avowed and critically dealt with within the explicit 
theoretical framework and texts of the speculative realist movement at this point, as far 
as I can tell. 
Now, this is not a criticism that’s unique to me. Both �i�ek and Badiou have com-
plained about this as well, and I think that there’s a middle path here that needs to be 
staked out. You have, for instance, the anti-scientism of much of 20th-century conti-
nental philosophy, especially with orientations like post-Marxist critical theory where 
a whole number of epistemological and ontological babies are thrown out with the 
bath water. The sciences are complicit with these very problematic, lamentable devel-
opments in the political and social registers, and therefore they have to be thoroughly 
critiqued, or we should find a way of sidelining them due to their complicity with a 
number of socio-political developments in the past century that are indeed to be be-
moaned. I think that’s too ‘all or nothing.’ Our options seem to be either an excessive 
over emphasis on the political that leads to a lot of very contentious, if not outright false, 
claims about disciplines like the sciences; or, at the other extreme, what I see in some 
of speculative realism, where issues in epistemology and ontology are dealt with in a 
vacuum. Again, I come back to Hegel, with his manner of looking at all these things as 
interlinked moments of each other. He is not necessarily committed to some sort of or-
ganic system on the basis of that, but, nonetheless, one very much has the sense of the 
conjunctual status of these things, how they are co-articulated with each other; or, as 
Badiou would put it, philosophy as looking at the manner in which its conditions cross-
resonate with one another and are involved in constellations of compossibility. That, for 
me, is a key middle path, whether one thinks of it in Hegelian or Badiouian terms, and 
I think that you see deviations on either side. Both speculative realism and, for instance, 
McDowell’s Pittsburgh Neo-Hegelianism, represent one kind of apolitical extreme, but 
something like Frankfurt School critical theory represents a deviation in the opposite 
direction where everything is political, and politics is so primary that it just blocks out of 
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the picture very important philosophical considerations, again, of a more epistemologi-
cal and ontological sort.
I see speculative realism as maybe an overreaction, in a certain way. It is an attempt 
to go back to being able to do philosophy without always conducting our thought under 
the shadow of things like the catastrophe of World War II, looking at rationally adminis-
tered societies, etc.; we realize that, no, there are things here which can’t just be lumped 
in with those sets of considerations and quickly dismissed.
Brian Smith: Do you see this overreaction reflected in the renewed enthusiasm for 
scientific reduction, so prevalent in speculative realism?
AJ: Yes, absolutely. To me this is a response that is very much conditioned by what 
came before, in a fashion that is problematic: letting one’s position be driven re-
actively. The key references here that you obviously have in mind would be the 
Churchlands and the new-fangled version of Churchlandian eliminative materialism 
as advocated most famously by Thomas Metzinger. Metzinger’s 2003 book Being No 
One combines the worst of both worlds, the hyper-technical medieval scholasticism 
of certain analytic philosophers with the long-winded, hulking-tome presentation of 
German philosophy. I think that’s why the translation of Brandom’s Making it Explicit 
was a best-selling book in Germany; it similarly uses this weird combination of those 
two styles. Brassier, of the speculative realist camp, is clearly the most enthusiastic 
advocate for that sort of approach, whereas with Hamilton Grant you have a kind 
of Deleuzianism read back into Schelling, and of course Graham Harman is any-
thing but sympathetic to that sort of scientistic position that Brassier represents. It’s 
still unclear how Meillassoux would come down on some of those things. He hasn’t 
tackled, in the way that someone like Brassier has,what analytics, following David 
Chalmers, call the ‘hard problem.’ I would be interested to see him wrangle with it. 
I have critiqued him for having some implicit assumptions in the background about 
the mind/world relationship, but we really have yet to see from him, I think, a thor-
oughly worked-out position on that. 
By the way, I realized that I went off on a tangent. One thing I forgot to add to the 
previous thought is the thing I like about Metzinger: he’s aware that we are unable to 
believe in the eliminative materialism of the Churchlands. Even if you read through 
the arguments and find them convincing, you are not able to internalize them, to 
really take on board in a first-person phenomenological sense which feels convinc-
ingly real and tangible. The Churchlandian position—that you have to view basically 
everything that you take to be real as an illusion of folk psychology, and that the only 
thing to truly exist are just assemblages of physical constituents that function in a cer-
tain fashion, like your neurons, and out there in the world there are not things like 
dogs, cats, mountains, trees, etc. but just this field of material stuff that then resonates 
with the material stuff you are and that’s it—is just not believable. We have a great 
deal of difficulty really accepting that this is the case; we’re still left with our, what you 
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might call in Kantian terms, transcendental or necessary illusion of much of what we 
take for granted at the folk psychological level being ‘real’. The nice thing Metzinger 
does is to say that we now have neuroscience to explain why it is that we can’t accept 
eliminativism as true, although it is true. It’s one step in advance of the Churchlands 
because it includes as part of its neurologically grounded account why we can’t accept 
the neurologically grounded account. For me, not only is eliminative materialism a 
problematic position on theoretical philosophical grounds; it’s hardly as though it is 
the mainstream view of most analytic philosophers of mind. The Churchlands are 
not the hegemons of that sub-discipline of analytic philosophy. Many continentalists 
really think the only flavour of analytic materialist philosophy out there is this elimi-
native variety, and that’s just not true. If you look at the neurosciences of the past few 
decades, a lot has happened. Many developments call into question previous philo-
sophical glosses of those sciences. Especially since the 1990s, new work points towards 
the neurosciences themselves being non-reductive, being much more spontaneously 
dialectical, in terms of a dialectical materialism as opposed to a reductive or elimina-
tive variety. And, I don’t see that reflected in something like Brassier’s stance; I think 
he erroneously identifies the Churchlands as standing on firm ground, not only philo-
sophically but empirically. At this point, they don’t. Really, I think that the eliminative 
materialist stance is based, at this point, on a very dated prior state of those neuro-
biological disciplines, and if you take seriously things like epigenetics, mirror neurons, 
and neuro-plasticity, eliminative materialism doesn’t do much justice to these things. 
Moreover, you have developments at the level of affective neuroscience which are not 
really containable, I think, within the theoretical confines of the eliminativist stance. 
And so, for me, I can see why Brassier would want to move in this direction because 
it’s to say: here are where the greatest fears of continental philosophy lie, in this nihil-
istic reductive materialism, and instead of fighting it off, let’s embrace it, and praise 
this as the culmination of post-enlightenment rational progress. I can see the appeal of 
that, but I think that the price he pays is that he has to play into false assumptions and 
images about what the scientific and analytic philosophical options are that are avail-
able, and the ones that I think are most promising are not the ones he goes for. But, in 
his work since Nihil Unbound, his turn to the grandfather of Pittsburgh neo-Hegelian-
ism, Wilfrid Sellars, strikes me as intriguing and full of a great deal of potential. I’m 
very eager to read what Brassier will produce in the years to come.
BS: So you’ve given us a negative critique of those positions. I want to move on to your 
positive construction of the subject. But I still want to talk about it in terms of reduc-
tionism. You are interested in the idea of the more than material subject as coming 
from a material base, but also at the same time it is influenced from above, where you 
draw on the symbolic in Lacan. So the subject is between these two sides. For you, is 
the subject a point of resistance against two potential reductive strategies: between a 
reduction to a material base, but also a similar kind of reduction, which would be to say 
that the subject is nothing more than a component of the social as a whole?
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AJ: Absolutely. I fully endorse that reading of what I’m up to, or after, and it’s a wonder-
fully clear and succinct way of translating what in some of my earlier work I’ve talked 
about in Lacanian parlance in terms of the subject as occupying a point of overlap 
between points of inconsistency within the registers of the Real and the Symbolic, in 
that you have corresponding to Lacan’s barred big ‘O’ Other in terms of the internally 
inconsistent symbolic order, you also have at the same time this barred Real, which 
would be the idea of the internal inconsistency, in this case, picking up on only select 
facets of the Lacanian Real, that material an sich is itself inconsistent. It’s thanks to the 
meeting up of these two points of inconsistency that you have the fullest most robust 
sense of subjectivity that I think is very much at stake in Lacanian and post-Lacanian 
variants of materialism.
BS: So, to move on from that. What I want to ask now is broadly how do you sit in re-
lation to someone like Graham Harman, or Bruno Latour. What is the emphasis that 
you place on the human subject, specifically? By that I mean, if we see the subject as 
coming from a material base but also being conditioned from above as well, what’s to 
stop us extending this into a series of levels, above continually and down below. Not ex-
actly like, but similar to Harman or Latour, these levels are black boxes, when we open 
up each box in the level below we find our material base actually has its own subjectiv-
ity which has its material base, and we’re the overdetermining aspect of it. What’s to 
stop us taking levels above and below and extending it into an infinite series, and enter-
ing into a more, maybe, object orientated realm?
AJ: My answer will be very provisional; it’s one of those questions that forces me to 
shoot from the hip, and those are the best ones.
I think that one of the key differences is that part of what I’m after, and this is one of 
the things that I take from �i�ek, is a commitment to the German Idealist traditon. If 
one wanted to paint in the broadest of broad brush strokes, one can say that the lowest 
common denominator of Kantian and post-Kantian German idealism is this notion 
of autonomous subjectivity, and, of course, this philosophical tradition sees itself as the 
cultural codification and consolidation of the French Revolution, among other things. 
This emphasis, then, on freedom as absolutely privileged is something which I very 
much agree with, and in this case, of course, there’s a real tension between myself and 
the background that I come out of (involving, among other things, German idealism 
as well as �i�ek’s thought) and someone like Harman; one of the things that is clearly 
part of the agenda of the wing of speculative realism that he represents is this anti-an-
thropocentrism, this wanting to argue against human privilege: we’re not exceptional 
we’re just a certain weird set of objects amongst others and so on and so forth. Going 
back to Mike’s question, with which we began, I explicitly endorse the emphasis on 
the peculiarity of the human that goes back to Pico della Mirandola’s C15th Ode to the 
Dignity of Man and look at that as really the earliest precursor of the certain aspect of 
the theory of subjectivity that I wish to defend, and I do think that there is something 
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odd, exceptional, whatever adjective you wish to use, about us. In fact, for me, we’re 
so strange that to do justice to the sorts of subjects that we are requires modifying our 
more global picture of being or nature, in order to consider ourselves as immanent to it. 
That, or course, sets me very much at odds with the object-oriented camp in that I 
think that we are exceptional, and that we are exceptional in a way that has to do with 
freedom, with the fact that weird structures of reflexivity or recursion are very much 
an essential part of the structure of our subjectivity in a way in which prevents us then 
being collapsed down to a flat plane within which we’re just arrayed with other objects, 
with no acknowledgment or concession that there is some sort of fundamental differ-
ence-in-kind, or some sort of free-standing status that is established that makes a subject 
something which can’t just be considered an object. That, I think, is absolutely essential 
to my approach. This insistence, then, that autonomy is a key component of subjectiv-
ity, albeit an autonomy that is immanently emergent out of this level of being, or matter, 
or even objects, that then comes to establish itself as thereafter a sort of self-grounded 
auto-reflexively relating set of structures or processes, which you can’t do full justice to 
if you don’t recognize the kind of self-enclosure that is established in the constitution of 
the subject out of this pre- or non-subjective background--that to me is the big difference 
between myself and someone like Harman. As I might put it somewhat provocatively, 
I’m just not enough of a self-hating human. It’s what Freud would call moral masoch-
ism. I recently wrote an extended critique of Bill Connolly’s immanent naturalism and 
Jane Bennett’s vital materialism. With both of them, their ecologically-informed politi-
cal stances drive their anti-humanism, their new version of what was already part of 
French philosophy with figures like Deleuze. For Hegelian reasons, I believe, as Hegel 
famously puts it in the1807 Phenomenology, one always has to think of substance also as 
subject, something that the Spinozism embraced by Connolly and Bennett deliberately 
avoids and forbids.
BS: That affirmation really reminds one of Sartre. I was wondering to what extent 
there would be an agreement between you and Sartre? When I read the Critique of 
Dialectical Reason, the main point that Sartre returns to endlessly throughout both vol-
umes is how there is no group subject. The individual is never dissolved within a group. 
Would you agree with that, as Sartre does, in the sense that it’s just structurally impos-
sible for that to happen or would you perhaps argue that it’s a real threat that the sub-
ject faces and has to resist?
AJ: I am initially tempted to try and find a way to have my cake and eat it too, with 
regards to the two alternatives that you propose. One thing I greatly appreciated 
about the event at Dundee was that Sartre came up several times. There was a recog-
nition that though he had fallen out of fashion for quite some time among the Anglo-
American world of scholars interested in French philosophy, where Sartre really was 
deemed passé in part because, I think, he was seen to be too close to more traditional 
conceptions of subjectivity, going back to the modern period, which he’s unapolo-
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getic about. His emphasis on radical freedom was considered to be too voluntarist, 
decisionist, etc. I’m delighted to see that interest in his work is reviving. Badiou wants 
to combine the figures he identifies as his three French masters: Sartre, Althusser 
and Lacan--with Lacan already trying to combine aspects, arguably, of Sartre and 
Althusser, even if Lacan was not always aware of being up to that, in those terms. I’m 
very much in favour of struggling toward some way of integrating those two sides, and 
a lot of my own work is striving for that sort of rapprochement between what Sartre 
represents, on the one hand, and what Althusser represents, on the other. Badiou does 
an admirable job of attempting to construct a theory of subjectivity at the intersec-
tion of those figures, and I appreciate some of the more Sartrean sides of him which 
often draw criticism. But, I’ve defended that part of his project in print. I am very 
sympathetic to the project Peter Hallward, another speaker at the Dundee event, is 
working out under the heading of «dialectical voluntarism,» which involves, among 
other things, reactivating Sartre and emphasizing the more Sartrean side of Badiou 
as crucial today. But, on the one hand, I think there are certain dimensions of subjec-
tivity that are structurally irreducible to trans-individual group level phenomena or 
processes, in the way that you articulated it as per the first alternative of the two you 
presented me with in your question. 
Also, I think that even if there’s something there that’s ineliminable, nevertheless, 
especially at the level of our experience of ourselves, in our practices, there can be the 
threat of, at least experientially, irreducibility being occluded, lost from view--a sense 
of dissolution or of being leveled down, reduced away, taken up without remainder into 
these non- or anti-individual matrices. I think that’s certainly a danger and a lot of how 
we position ourselves could be seen as a reaction to that threat. Even if it can’t, in the 
end, just do away with it structurally, it can so eclipse it from view that de facto it might 
as well, for all intents and purposes, be an elimination along those lines. 
In the background are some dawning problems with different uses of the word «sub-
ject.» There’s a great deal of work to be done in terms of disambiguating certain terms 
that have been made to carry so much weight and have been loaded with so many dif-
ferent significations and connotations that sometimes we end up in debates with each 
other that are false debates, I think. For instance, the Badiou-verses-�i�ek debate about 
subjectivity is a false conflict that’s based upon the fact that you have different parties 
using the word «subject» in different ways, and that if you start doing some labour of 
disambiguation you realize that there’s not necessarily the impasse or direct conflict 
that’s seen to be there, when we were fighting this semantic tug-of-war over this single 
word. So, this is as much a call to myself as to anyone else, since I use figures like Badiou 
and �i�ek together, and draw on other resources and other traditions that speak of sub-
jectivity. I do think we’re going to have to begin doing some labour to take that single 
word and tease out of it the different levels and layers that have been compressed into it. 
Hyper-compression has created, in some cases, false problems. We shouldn’t be spend-
ing our time mired in these false debates, but, instead, figuring out where the genuine 
bones of contention lie.
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BS: So, for example, the way that you discuss the subject in �i�ek and Lacan is closer 
to the individual in Badiou’s philosophy as opposed to the subject?
AJ: Yes, although both Slavoj and I are very adamant that one of the things that’s 
missing from Badiou is that you have the stark contrast between, on the one hand, the 
individual, the mere miserable human animal, and, on the other hand, you have the 
post-evental immortal subject that’s faithful to a given evental truth cause. There’s this 
missing third dimension in Badiou, which would be what �i�ek is after in many cases 
when he talks about subjectivity in terms of the Lacanian subject as a radicalization of 
the Freudian death drive, which itself captures what the German idealists were after, 
especially Hegel, when speaking of negativity. For both �i�ek and myself there’s a lot 
that’s involved in this third dimension, which makes possible the shift from the mere 
creature wrapped up in interests of self-preservation, of pleasure, etc., and the possi-
bility of what Badiou speaks of as subjectivity, this thorough-going fidelity that breaks 
with that animal background. Staking out that middle ground as what �i�ek has called 
a vanishing mediator between these different dimensions is important to me.
MB: My next question has to do with the notion of emergence. I’ve seen you critique 
both Badiou and Meillassoux on different fronts. Your critique of Meillassoux seems 
to be, and this is a critique that Hagglund levels as well, that his account of the emer-
gence of life from materiality is problematic for multiple reasons. In the same way you 
critique Badiou for his notion of the grace of the event. I wonder how much your cri-
tiques hinge on the latent religiosity of the terminology utilized by both Meillassoux 
and Badiou?
AJ: There are two different critical strata that I’m playing with here. I think, to begin 
with, you could strip out my obvious resistance to religion, you could strip that out 
of my critiques of both figures, and there would still be core arguments against their 
positions. For example, concerning the Meillassoux piece in the Speculative Turn, for 
me the real heart of the critique has to do with looking at the explanatory price to 
be paid for endorsing his ontology of hyper-chaos, just at the level of philosophy of 
science. As I put it in this recent text on McDowell, which involves some additional 
embellishments on my critiques of speculative realism, the price is, in my view, too 
high. What you have to accept in terms of what you allow for at the level even of sci-
entific practice, and the theorizations based on that practice, strike me as yielding 
instances of reductio ad absurdum that problematize Meillassoux’s initial position. I do 
weigh it out in a way that stands on its own apart from considerations of, you might 
say, religious and, by extension, political upshots of some of his positions. Now, at 
the same time, given my increasingly Hegelian sensibilities, what I demand of myself 
and others is that one keeps one’s eye on what might be the unintended reverbera-
tions beyond one’s immediate concerns. Let’s say that one is just zeroing in on a cer-
tain set of epistemological and ontological issues having to do with the philosophy/
science relationship. That’s a good and important project. But, I think at the same 
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time one has to be sensitive about how these things are inseparably interwoven with 
each other; that there are social and political dimensions that are part of the context 
that you’re looking at. And, you can ignore those issues, but I think that it enriches 
one’s own work, and it’s also being intellectually responsible, to keep one’s eye on, 
at least peripherally, the sort of halo of surrounding issues, topics, and areas where 
there are inevitably going to be reverberations, consequences etc. This is where I 
say that even though Meillassoux is often compared to Lenin, and especially Lenin’s 
1908 Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, by contrast Lenin does do that. In fact, if any-
thing, what he’s often criticized for in that text is his brutal crudeness when handling 
the history of philosophy. Just on strict philosophical grounds, one can’t comfortably 
endorse some of his readings of the relationship between the different figures of the 
modern period and how he positions Berkeley, Hume, Kant, etc. in relation to each 
other. But, it’s not an ignorant crudeness; it is a calculated crudeness. To put it in 
Badiouian parlance, Lenin is wanting to force certain decisions to be taken in the 
face of points (as that word is used in the Logics of Worlds) so as to eliminate any pos-
sibility of fence-straddling--and to do so with an eye to the situation of philosophy 
in his time as very much bound up with its wider conjunction. And, I think that this 
Hegelian-Marxist approach is something to which I remain faithful, to use Badiou’s 
language again. 
I know that Meillassoux wrote Divine Inexistence as his dissertation before After Fini-
tude; I wrote the piece in the Speculative Turn that you refer to about two or three years 
ago. I was only dimly aware of the Divine Inexistence project through this article that he 
published in the French journal Critique, which had this talk of the God-to-come; for me, 
my critique, even of the religiosity, is not at all undercut by someone who would point 
to it and say ‘Oh well he was already interested in this divine inexistence material’. The 
apparatus of After Finitude contains polemics against fideism, against much of what we 
readily recognize as involved in this revival of the religious within the continental philo-
sophical tradition. One can point to his dissertation, but I don’t think that just because 
he wrote Divine Inexistence before After Finitude that his theses fit together well; I think 
there’s an internal tension there.
MB: Do you think that it’s your specific engagement with the sciences that differenti-
ates your account of how a more-than-material subject emerges from materiality from 
the accounts given by Badiou and Meillassoux, for the emergence of events or life? In 
really simple terms, there seems to be a similar structure happening there.
AJ: Yes, there’s this similar structure, although Badiou refuses to tie his version of ma-
terialism to the natural sciences and Meillassoux has yet to expand upon his views re-
garding subjectivity. . You’ve heard me use this line before, so pardon me for repeat-
ing the over-used, over-paraphrased Churchill one-liner: I think the empirical experi-
mental sciences of modernity are the worst basis for constructing things like theories 
of subjectivity except for all those others that we’ve tried from time to time. Along these 
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lines, Brassier is one of my closest fellow travellers in that both of us are adamant that 
modern science is not something to be held warily at arms length or even aggressively 
checked externally from the standpoint of philosophy; he and I agree that, instead, we 
need to, as many of the analytics have done, embrace the sciences, really accept that 
they are a fundamental part of our Weltanschauung and seek in them resources as op-
posed to problematic points to be resisted, criticized, rejected, etc. For me, the balanc-
ing act of my position, where I think it represents an alternative, is that, on the one 
hand, it involves concurring with Brassier that there is something fundamental about 
the sciences and that the progress we make in those disciplines cannot be ignored save 
for at the price of some kind of irresponsible intellectual bankruptcy; but, on the other 
hand, I don’t think that those sciences necessarily produce, in fact I think they point 
in the opposite direction, they don’t produce a reductive picture where everything can 
be explained from within the sciences themselves. I think that the sciences are show-
ing how you can scientifically explain why everything can’t be explained scientifically, 
as it were. This goes back to that Hegelian phenomenological gesture in the section on 
‘Observing Reason’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit that the sciences produce out of them-
selves, on their own grounds, an internal delimitation of their explanatory jurisdic-
tions. You can say that you have an empirical explanatory ground for why an empirical 
experimental approach can’t account for everything that you’re after, which is different 
from just dogmatically insisting what ultimately would have to come down to a kind of 
a priori theoretical dogmatism, a sort that I don’t think is very defensible, for example, 
simply saying, “No, there’s this dimension which can’t be reduced down to that level 
and that’s it.” I think that to have a scientific account for why you can’t reduce every-
thing to the sciences is a way to get what you want, for instance, to keep what, I will 
concede, for instance, religion, various kinds of theological approaches are describing, 
things that are there, I think, albeit in a very distorted form or in a kind of dualistic or 
anti-reductivitst stance. I think you can get all of that without having to fall back on 
what, in my view, are very shaky, a priori, foot-stamping, fist-banging sorts of postu-
lates or insistences that are threatened by the sciences. My position sounds like having 
your cake and eating it too, but I do think that there are good scientific supports for 
the idea that a subject that is not itself capturable by the sciences emerges out of what 
the sciences are looking at, and I think that those disciplines themselves are providing 
the resources for that account, which I seek to harness in this very Hegelian way too, 
of stepping back and just allowing those disciplines to unfold their own resources and 
then, as Hegel put it, recollecting the results. But, of course, the picture that emerges 
is different from what a lot of people who aren’t sympathetic to this approach would 
think, which is that in the end you’re still going to fall into something like eliminative, 
or reductive materialism. I don’t think so.
BS: So, you think, in a sense, this divergence that you get between the subject’s actual 
behaviour and our explanation of that behaviour, via the best current scientific model, 
can be given a positive account? We are not limited to a simple negative account of 
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this divergence, in terms of the weaknesses or flaws of our current, incomplete, science? 
This irreducibility can be accounted for in a positive sense, and that’s the role of phi-
losophy, to try and give a positive account of the way in which science and subjectivity 
will never completely coincide and merge?
AJ: Absolutely.Even though Badiou and I disagree about the nature and status of the 
sciences and scientificity, nonetheless, in terms of certain aspects of my approach, I’m 
deeply indebted to him. I come back to this idea of philosophy’s role as putting certain 
of its conditions in cross-resonating relationship with each other and exploring their 
compossibility, and so one of the features of my work that sometimes gets more atten-
tion than others is the fact that I draw on resources from the natural sciences generally, 
and the life sciences especially. For me, it’s never just a matter of fixating upon those dis-
ciplines, it’s about trying to see how those disciplines become self-sundering, reaching 
this point where they’re beginning to demarcate their own boundaries. That calls for 
work from other sides too., How are certain resources from philosophy, psychoanalysis, 
political theory, etc. necessarily part of this picture as well, and how do we then start 
constructing the links between those different domains and developments? That’s very 
much what I’m after. There are important contributions that, for example, a Lacanian 
psychoanalytic framework brings. It’s not that we have to, in a one-way fashion, rework 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, rework the various philosophers and philosophical orienta-
tions that I’m talking about, due to these sciences. It’s also an issue of asking: how do we 
have to modify these sciences, or how would their research programmes have to alter, 
in light of key contributions from philosophy and psychoanalysis? The sciences have, 
in some cases, vindicated us, and it’s not just a matter of us having to make concessions 
to them; that’s part of the rhetoric I was deploying at the end of my talk last year in 
Dundee. The dialectical sword slices both ways. The sciences have reached the point 
where they are going to have to accept that their interpretations of their data and their 
research programmes require significant modification in light of the contributions, for 
the past two centuries, we’ve been making on the philosophical side of things.
BS: Isn’t one of the deepest ways in which that comes out is that for any reductive pro-
gramme in science, and some other traditional approaches in science, there is the fun-
damental belief that the Real, or Nature, is in some sense consistent. Whereas what 
you’ve always been talking about, in the psychoanalytic aspect of your work, is pre-
cisely that the Real, or Nature, or whatever you want to call it, is not consistent, and it’s 
that which is going to be the fundamental shift from the point of view of science in its 
relation to philosophy.
AJ: Yes, and there’s a lot of work to be done in this regard. In addition to McDowell, 
one of the other key figures who features in a piece I recently finished is the London 
School of Economics’ philosopher of science Nancy Cartwright. I think her work is 
very important. She’s published a number of books, but the text that is really invalu-
able for my purposes, although it builds on earlier work of hers, is the 1999 book The 
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Dappled World: A Study in the Boundaries of Science. On the basis of considerations internal 
to much more analytically orientated philosophy of science, she argues for a vision of 
Nature as a de-totalized jumble of constituents that are not bound together by some 
sort of seamless underlying fundamental unity. She pleads for that very much on strict 
philosophy of science grounds, claiming that if you’re an empiricist and realist, then the 
weight of the evidence should lead you to gamble in the opposite direction, not to invest 
your faith in what is a metaphysical article of faith regarding the ultimate unity, homo-
geneity, and seamlessness of reality, its reducibility to basic fundamental laws. Keep in 
mind that this is an article of faith that in practice is unprovable, even if all humanity 
for the rest of our existence were to spend its time crunching data; we would never get 
to the point where we would be able to take just a one-minute slice of the behavior of a 
mid-sized perceivable organism, like another human being or even a smaller animal, 
to reduce everything down to, say, the quantum constituents of this organism, and then 
to show that there’s a seamless linkage that flows from the base up to the more complex 
aggregate levels that proves reductionism is right. Reductionism is a metaphysical ar-
ticle of faith, it’s a gamble, it’s a hypothesis. Even though a lot people want to be realist 
about it, at it’s strongest it’s just what Kant called a regulative ideal, and what he calls 
specifically in the Prolegomena the cosmological idea of reason as a regulative ideal for 
natural scientific practice. It might be a good heuristic device and I think it does have 
its value, at that level, but I think that one shouldn’t mistake a good heuristic device 
for a solid basis for an ontology. I think we’re much closer to what Cartwright calls 
“the dappled world” or what you point to, for which I use Lacanian and Badiouian 
language, when I speak of this not-One, non-All nature as our best picture of nature. I 
think that there are both psychoanalytic and philosophy of science considerations that 
show that there is better evidence for Cartwright’s dappled world, or for the de-total-
ized real of Lacan and Badiou. There’s even better evidence just looking at the state of 
the sciences and their historical achievements and lack of achievements than there is 
for the old reductivist dogma.
BS: Isn’t this the reversal of the standard interpretation of the consequences of Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems? The orthodox response has been to affirm consistency at the 
expense of completeness, as opposed to affirming completeness at the expense of con-
sistency, due, mainly, to equating inconsistency with incoherence? 
AJ: That’s right. A colleague of mine here, Paul Livingston, who is a person who 
does very interesting cross tradition work between the analytic and continental, has 
a book coming out entitled The Politics of Logic. The two main figures he discusses are 
Wittgenstein and Badiou. In addressing Badiou, Livingston goes back to how Gödel 
condenses in a very clear way this fundamental set of alternatives involving consis-
tency: you have consistency but at the price of completeness. The alternative that you 
point to he very clearly lays out. We’ve had conversations about this, and he even no-
ticed in some of my earlier work I run the terms «inconsistency» and «incompleteness» 
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together, and that’s something I’m in the process of rethinking in the light of his work, 
because he did a lot of work in mathematics and analytical philosophy and logic, and 
he’s now turned his attention to Badiou. If you’re also already sensitive to these issues 
in terms of these sets of alternatives that are forced upon us with a real reckoning with 
Gödel, I think that this work by Livingston will be quite good. Livingston quite rightly 
identified that I tend to go for exactly what you were talking about there: a totality that 
is an inconsistent totality. That’s very much what I’m after, and, of course, it’s what you 
have in Hegel and �i�ek as well, I think; you can see a definite chaining together of 
positions in terms of a chain of equivalence that represents something fundamental to 
our approaches despite whatever other differences you might isolate.
MB: We’re curious to ask where you see philosophy going in the next few years, with 
particular reference to how both European and Anglo-American philosophers are re-
turning to Hegel and idealism in general, as a general resource. What do you see as the 
crucial philosophical questions for the current generation?
AJ: I’ve got to say I think this is one of the most exciting times to be in philosophy, de-
spite, of course, the job market. You have the combination of absolutely brutal practical 
circumstances of the most depressing sort, but simultaneously some of the most prom-
ising work being done alongside this, in these circumstances. As critical as I am, for 
instance, of certain aspects of speculative realism, or other recent orientations, none-
theless I’m delighted to see these things happening. There’s a greater awareness of se-
rious problems that were eclipsed from view due to certain dominant trends and ob-
sessions in much of what counted for continental philosophy, especially in the Anglo-
American world, throughout a good portion of the middle to late 20th century. In 
large part thanks to Badiou and �i�ek, there has been a really interesting break with 
the phenomenological and post-phenomenological developments that held such sway, 
and were so glaringly front and centre in terms of English-speaking work, in continen-
tal philosophy. What’s followed holds out the promise for a number of different new 
alliances between the kind of philosophical traditions we come out of and fields such 
as the sciences, but also, of course, analytic philosophy. One of the things that causes 
the analytic and continental traditions to separate from each other and become op-
posed stances is the disputed status of Hegel’s philosophy. In the beginning of the 20th 
century you have Russell and company in reaction to the excesses of late 19th century 
British Hegelianism: they reject Hegel completely, utterly break with him, in the same 
way that Descartes did with the scholastics. For most analytic philosophers who are 
around even today, their history of philosophy training involved going as far as P. F. 
Strawson’s Kant and then leaping over everything for about a century and landing 
with Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein at the start of the 20th century, maybe a little 
Meinong before that, but that’s it. And, of course, Hegel was cut out of that picture. For 
all my reservations about Pittsburgh-style Neo-Hegelianism, I see it as one of the most 
promising developments in terms of overcoming analytical/continental divides involv-
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ing using Hegel as providing a lingua franca in which we can begin having conversa-
tions with each other that we haven’t been able to have up until this point, given that 
the continental tradition is so deeply indebted to Hegel and to what he opens up in a 
number of ways. I’m very interested in reaching out and engaging with figures on the 
analytic side. One of the problems I have with a lot of speculative realism is, again, the 
people interested in it have not had any exposure or any serious sustained exposure to 
the analytic tradition, and therefore fail to realize what resources are out there in terms 
of people who’ve been working on the realism/anti-realism problem, issues having to 
do with scientific law and the status of causality, etc. You have just this wealth of ma-
terial that’s yet to be fully tapped and that would allow for a lot of cross-fertilization. 
One of the things I hope that’s going to happen is that the younger generation of 
people working in continental philosophy will be able to begin dissolving these long-
standing disciplinary divides, not just by simply continuing to present the material 
they’ve been doing, but dipping into the wealth of material, the resources that are there, 
for instance, in the analytic tradition. That idea of bringing the strengths of both sides 
together is one thing I’m very hopeful for and that I’m now beginning to try to do myself 
in a more sustained fashion.
MB: Thus far your own work and your two most recent manuscripts have been focused 
on Zizek and Badiou, and I think something that’s differentiated your work from other 
people writing on Zizek and Badiou is that in both of these works a position seems to 
emerge that’s neither Zizek or Badiou but rather your own position and your own sort 
of constructive work. So where is your research and your project going, and what can 
we expect to see in the future from Adrian Johnston?
AJ: At this point, I’m writing the second volume of a two-volume materialism project. 
The first volume is entitled Alain Badiou and the Outcome of Contemporary French Philosophy: 
From Lacan to Meillassoux, casting Badiou in the position of Feuerbach à la Engels’ 
1888 Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. Volume one is a kind 
of ground-clearing operation. I hope I’ve already settled my debts with �i�ek, who, 
of course, I feel very close to in certain ways. But there are other figures, who I con-
sider to be intellectual neighbours in relation to whom I feel very proximate and yet 
disagree stringently with on certain key points; these others are Lacan, Badiou, and 
Meillassoux. So, I settle my differences with them in the first volume as a way to set up 
the second volume, which is where I delineate what I’m after in its fullest form in terms 
of what I call transcendental materialism. 
It will probably take me about another year to complete the second volume. An-
other forthcoming project is this book I co-authored with Catherine Malabou, which is 
now entitled Self  and Emotional Life: Merging Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neurobiology. My 
portion of that involves looking at the vexing Freudian-Lacanian problem of affects in 
relation to the unconscious and re-evaluating that in light of the resources of contempo-
rary affective neuroscience. Those are the things that are on the chopping block.
